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ABSTRACT: The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, 
that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) 
mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they 
realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. 
I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of cau-
sal claims. The paper shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, 
using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger 
philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empiri-
cal, not a priori and universal.
KEYWORDS: mechanisms; causation; causal mediation; scientific norms.
RESUMEN: La afirmación de que los mecanismos constituyen esencialmente “buena ciencia” está amplia-
mente extendida. Argumentaré, sin embargo, que esta afirmación es ambigua en varios sentidos. Distinguiré 
diferentes versiones de la idea de mecanismo: (1) mecanismos horizontales —entre causa y efecto— y mecan-
ismos verticales —asientan propiedades causales en términos de bajo nivel—; y (2) diferentes fines o usos que 
los mecanismos pueden tener. A continuación, me centraré en la tesis de que los mecanismos son, en diversos 
sentidos, necesarios para la confirmación de enunciados causales. Sirviéndose del marco estándar hoy día —
estructuras gráficas causales—, el artículo muestra que los mecanismos pueden ser útiles, esenciales o dañinos 
dependiendo del contexto. Estas conclusiones también respaldan una tesis más general en filosofía de la cien-
cia: que las normas metodológicas en ciencia son, con frecuencia, relativas al contexto y empíricas, y no a priori 
y universales.
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The idea that mechanisms are importantly involved in good science is now widely asserted. 
However, the meanings of “mechanisms” and the rationales for them are still unclear in 
the literature. This paper sorts out theses and possible arguments and shows that mecha-
nisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context. It also offers some support 
for idea that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not 
a priori and universal. Thus, the goals of the paper are four: to clarify some of these claims 
about mechanisms, to show that strong claims about the necessity of mechanisms as evi-
dence are implausible, to show that some weaker claims may be plausible but depend on 
contextual details, and to support the view that plausible methodological norms in science 
are often empirical and local.
The literature on mechanisms is enormous1 and the potential issues many. I do not 
claim to address all the issues and corresponding commentary. To keep the topic manage-
able, I focus here on claims about evidence.2 I also focus on practices standard in the social 
and behavioral sciences. However, the general framework I describe for analyzing the need 
for mechanisms as evidence could perhaps fruitfully be applied to claims about mechanisms 
and evidence in, for example, in medicine. But I will not support that claim here – it would 
deserve considerably more discussion.
Section 1 cites some of the standard claims in the literature about mechanisms and 
then Section 2 provides a matrix of meanings and rationales that demonstrates there are 
many different claims at stake and provides a specific set of questions that seem to be at 
issue when assertions are about mechanisms and evidence. Evidence about mechanisms 
in the form of mediating causes is the topic of Section 3. Section 4 looks at theses about 
mechanism as the realizing underlying details of causal properties. Section 5 finishes by as-
sessing more moderate claims about mechanisms and identifies some situations where they 
are indeed plausible. Throughout the moral is that methodological claims about mecha-
nisms in providing evidence are often local empirical issues which have to be evaluated case 
by case depending on the kinds of causal structures involved.
1. The Mechanisms Bandwagon
Enthusiastic claims that mechanisms are essential to good science currently abound. Phi-
losophers are an important part of the chorus, but social scientists are advocates as well 
(Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998). Both groups make strong and diverse claims on behalf of 
mechanisms.
Here are some typical examples:
“[...] a plausible mechanism or theoretical connection is required to warrant the more general 
claim that “C causes E,” probabilistic evidence needs to be accounted for by an underlying mech-
anism before the causal claim can be established, and to establish casual claims, scientists need the 
mutual support of mechanism and dependencies.” (Russo and Williamson 2007, p. 159)
1 See, for example, Craver and Tabery (2016) and Glennan and Illari (2018) for surveys.
2 If explanatory power is evidence then the distinction between mechanisms for evidential reasons vs. 
explanatory reasons may call for added complexity. I do not think that inference to the best explana-
tion actually adds additional evidence (see Day and Kincaid, 1990; Kincaid, 1996, Chapter 1) but this 
is a complication that is not necessary for the points that follow.
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“[...] evidence of mechanisms is crucial to establishing both efficacy and external validity.” 
(Parkkinen et al., 2018, p. 6)
One “needs both evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanisms to establish a causal 
claim.” (Parkkinen et al., 2013, p. 4)
The demand for mechanisms involves both “mechanisms (a complex arrangement of entities 
and activities, organised in such a way as to be regularly or predictably responsible for the phe-
nomenon to be explained) and mechanistic processes (a spatio-temporal pathway along which 
certain features are propagated from the starting point to the end point).” (Parkkinen et al., 2013, 
p. 11)
“[...] all interpretation in terms of causality of macro-variable explanations based on variable 
correlations is considered unsatisfactory unless the action level mechanisms triggering the social 
phenomena can be identified.” (Demeulaere, 2011, p. 17)
“Efficacy is established if one can establish, in the study population, the existence of a correla-
tion and the existence of a mechanism that can explain this correlation.” (Parkkinen et al., 2013, 
p. 24)
It is “broadly correct” that “a causal hypothesis in medicine can be established only by using 
both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism.” (Gillies, 2019, p.133)
“[...] the advancement of social theory calls for an analytical approach that systemati-
cally seeks to explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations.” 
( Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998, p. 1)
The demand for mechanisms is not new. Elster (1989) asserted 30 years ago that mech-
anisms are needed in the context of debates about functional explanations in the social 
sciences to avoid confounding.3 Currently, the demand for mechanisms is extended to the 
social and behavioral sciences and medicine and sometimes is an all-purpose claim about 
good science in general.
I should make clear several points about this literature and my project here. Not every-
body who talks about mechanisms makes all these claims; there are more subtle views ad-
vanced and I shall mention them at various points. Also, my goal is not to do a survey of the 
literature. It is to sort out some confusions still present, to show that claims about mecha-
nisms have to be evaluated according to empirical context, and to provide some concrete il-
lustrations of this claim.
2. Approaching the Plurality of Mechanism Claims
As can be gleaned from the above quotations, there are numerous different and often logi-
cally independent claims and rationales about mechanisms. Here is a list of some of the dif-
ferent questions involved that need to be distinguished:
a) What scientific virtues do mechanisms provide or embody? There are distinct 
claims in the literature about whether mechanisms are used to provide evidence 
or are used to provide adequate explanations. Even if I have a well-confirmed ex-
3 And on my view was properly put in its place not long after that (Kincaid, 1996, 1997).
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planation, I might still think mechanisms are necessary to make the explanation 
deep, deep enough, deeper than some other well-confirmed explanation, and so on. 
Then looking at scientific practice as dynamic, one might claim as some have that 
searching for mechanisms is the best way to promote scientific progress, however 
that is specified.
b) To what degree are mechanisms needed? Are they essential? Always useful if not 
essential? Sometimes useful? “Usually” useful? If not essential, when and why are 
they useful?
c) At what level are mechanisms supposed to be given? It helps to distinguish be-
tween horizontal and vertical mechanisms (Kincaid, 1996; Kastner and Andersen, 
2018).4 Horizontal mechanisms roughly are those at the same level as the cause 
and effect. The simplest cases of horizontal mechanisms are intervening or inter-
mediate causes or variables of the fashion: cause à mediator à effect, the notion 
invoked by Gillies above. Vertical mechanisms refer to the component elements 
and structure that explain the properties, activities, etc. of the whole they make up 
– this is the notion of mechanism in the Machamer et al. tradition (2000) cited 
above. These distinctions are still simplifications. In particular, we will see below 
that when it comes to evidence, horizontal mechanisms can importantly be not 
just mediating, “in between” causes, but they can also be other causal factors that 
influence the cause, mediators and/or the final effect. Also, vertical and horizontal 
mechanism can no doubt also be combined into a mixed, multilevel account.
d) What sort of scientific product do we want mechanisms to help with? If we talk of 
causes, do we want them for determining the presence of causal effects or causal effect 
size? These are not the same. Do we want them to explain, confirm, etc. token events, 
e.g. the result of this RCT, or to explain, confirm, etc. generalizations? Models?
e) How exactly does evidence about mechanisms integrate into our total evidence? It 
could just be “additive” – just one more piece of evidence, it could trump or have 
more weight than other pieces of evidence, it could serve specific inferential func-
tions, such as ruling out confounders, and so on.
More parameters could be identified. However, this list already suggests numerous differ-
ent possible claims about mechanisms, many of them independent and some interdepend-
ent in various ways. Proceeding without being specific about which of these many claims 
are being discussed, defended, or criticized is asking for confusion. Furthermore, several of 
these elements can mean different things in different contexts and/or admit of subtypes 
and thus produce still further, different questions. I narrow the window somewhat in what 
follows by addressing only the epistemological issues raised.
With the above set of questions in view, it is helpful to have an explicit approach to 
methodological norms in science – of assertions like those above about how science should 
4 There is an orthogonal distinction which takes mechanisms to be some deeper cause that somehow 
makes standard causal claims possible – a background structure as it were (Mahoney 2016). I am not 
sure what this comes to as suggestive as it is. It may be related to the idea of a necessary cause – one 
which is required but insufficient by itself. Throughout my discussion I am focusing on standard suf-
ficient causes —ones that have an effect on their own— not because I think the social world is always 
like that but because such considerations add more complexity than I can take on here.
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work. In what follows I adopt a view that might be labelled “contextualism” (Williams, 
1999; Kincaid, 2005). This approach is not the analytic philosophy doctrine that wants to 
give the necessary and sufficient conditions of our use of “know”. Rather, contextualism 
in my sense is an antifoundationalist, pragmatist idea that emphasizes among other things 
that what we count as evidence depends on what else we know and what we are trying to 
do. Judgments about good science then are ultimately empirical claims.
Contextualism applied to debates over mechanisms suggests that there will be few de-
fensible general scientific norms about them. Methodological norms, like all claims, are 
defeasible and ultimately empirical. Given the holism of evidence and theory, when and 
where those norms apply depends on context. Relatively general formal rules for inference 
are to be applauded if we can get them. In some specific situations we can do so, as for ex-
ample we can do sometimes for causal inference as I will discuss below. Yet, broad and sub-
stantive morals about good science are unlikely, and that holds for morals about mecha-
nisms. I develop this claim throughout the paper.
A natural set of questions for thinking about the role of mechanisms in confirmation 
flows from the contextualist approach above.5 Assume I am asking whether I should believe 
that H, given some new evidence E. Making that decision would involve asking at least the 
following questions:
1. How much prior evidence do I have that H?
2. How much does my claim that H presuppose about mechanisms?
3. How much evidence do I have about purported mechanisms?
4. How well does H fit with E?
5. What alternatives are there to H, and how well do they answer 1. - 4.?
These questions could be given a Bayesian gloss as getting at p(H), p(not H), p(E/H) and 
p(E/not H), but that rendering is unnecessary. These questions can equally be seen as just 
instantiations of the principle of total evidence. Details will have to be fleshed out case by 
case with the parameters noted above, e.g. it needs to be specified whether we are talking 
about horizontal or vertical mechanisms, if the causal claim is one of effect or effect size, 
and so on. The questions obviously have to be weighted if we were pretending to be pre-
cise. But for a rough judgment, it is fairly obvious that mechanisms can play a large role or a 
small, depending on our answers.
In the mechanisms literature a common situation concerns the status of a causal claim 
based on a data set of correlations. Smoking correlates with lung cancer in a specific set 
of observations. At the same time there are various pieces of evidence relevant to a possi-
ble mechanism linking smoking and lung cancer. The issue then is the relative role of the 
correlational and mechanistic evidence. That requires answering the five questions above 
where H is a causal claim and we must decide how our answers combine. This formulation 
of the issues is the focus here.6
5 I sketched this framework some time ago (Kincaid, 1996) and more recently others have come to 
roughly similar conclusions, though with less clarity I believe (Illari, 2011).
6 Causation here is sufficient causation where causes individually and independently contribute effects. 
More complex types of causation where there are necessary conditions and causal interaction —mod-
eration of one causal effect by the level of another— are not considered but should be in a longer, more 
complete discussion.
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3. Horizontal Mechanisms as Essential for Evidence about Causal Effect Claims
Keeping in mind the distinctions and questions just discussed, I turn now to look at one 
common version of the demand for mechanisms. These demands have to specify how 
much mechanistic evidence counts and what kind of mechanism claim is being invoked. 
Recall that we are investigating only claims about evidence.7
The strong claims for mechanisms as found in Russo and Williamson (2008), Parkki-
nen et al. (2018), or in Gillies (2019) basically seems to assert that the answer to the fourth 
question should be one of strong evidence and that an affirmative answer is a necessary 
condition to establish that C causes E or, perhaps, is a necessary condition to establish ef-
fect size (though this difference goes unnoted). Thus, it does not matter how positively we 
answer the first three questions, if we do not have strong evidence for a mechanism, then 
we do not have good evidence that C causes E.8
To evaluate this demand for mechanisms, we have to fill in further details as we 
showed in the previous section. Though the literature is consistently unclear on some key 
parameters, the core claim is:
HME: Horizontal mechanisms taken as intervening or mediating variables are essential to es-
tablish a causal relation between correlated factors C and E.
This claim, while more explicit than some formulations in the literature, is still unclear. It 
is quiet on whether this is about establishing a causal relation or a causal effect size or both? 
It is also unclear on how mechanisms are needed – what role do they play in the inferential 
process? The claim is also unclear because the literature vacillates on “essential,” sometimes 
qualifying with “usually.” We will return to these ambiguities later. For now, I focus on the 
claim that mechanisms are essential evidence to show that an effect exists.
What is the argument for HME? Often, it is just stated as an obvious basic methodo-
logical principle or “thesis” (Russo and Wiliamson, 2007). Frequently, it is suggested that 
mechanisms are needed to avoid confounding when our data is correlational. For exam-
ple, Trampusch and Palier (2016, p. 437), two political scientists, say that finding medi-
ating factors is “predominantly defined as a method aiming to identify or test hypotheses 
on causal mechanisms in order to compensate for weaknesses in correlational analysis. The 
method is even sometimes viewed as the ‘only method.’”
HME is implausible, as I show now. There are two serious regress problems that con-
front HME. Moreover, it contradicts both good informal and formal causal reasoning.
There are two obvious related regress problems for HME. The first is that a mediator is 
defined as something that causes the final effect. So, we have another causal relation when 
we identify a mediator between C and E – do I then have to show how it, the mediator, 
7 I am furthermore limiting my discussion directly only to what might be called internal validity. As the 
quotes show, it is asserted that mechanism are essential for external validity, i.e. generalizing from one 
causal situation to another. I think the arguments given here hold of that claim as well but that is be-
yond my purview here.
8 There are also suggestions about sufficiency: if we have strong evidence about mechanisms and corre-
lational data supporting C’s effect on E, then we have strong evidence for the claim of C’s effect on E. 
This will be indirectly addressed later.
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causes the final effect? The obvious question is where do we stop and why? We seem to be 
forced to provide indefinitely many intervening mechanisms.
The force of the regress here is that there is an apparent claim that for any assertion 
A causes B, the mechanism in the form of an intervening variable M has to be provided. 
However, that then entails that A causes M and M causes B. These seem to be causal claims 
to which the mechanism requirement would thus apply and hence we need another set of 
mechanisms. Of course, in practice we find reason to stop the regress. However, that just 
means we do not apply a methodological norm about mechanisms universally, but that 
there are contexts, background knowledge, purposes of investigation, etc. involved.
The second regress problem concerns how mechanisms get established in the first 
place. The literature talks of “mechanistic evidence” as though it was something that was 
sui generis and that does not require arguing from correlations. Thus, Russo and William-
son (2007, p. 159) say: “Evidence is constituted by two complementary elements: proba-
bilities and mechanisms.” Yet, that claim is false – experimental reasoning involves arguing 
from correlations or probabilities between interventions and outcomes. In fact, defenders 
of MHE find themselves sometimes arguing that RCTs need mechanisms, but RCTs are 
experiments in the real sense of the term. There is no correlation-free independent mecha-
nistic evidence that can ground correlations – correlations, mechanisms and inference ap-
parently are an interdependent package. Thus, the argument for HME cannot be about 
any causal claim simpliciter. If causal claims require mechanistic evidence instead of corre-
lational evidence alone, but mechanistic evidence essentially uses correlation evidence itself, 
then that evidence needs further mechanistic evidence, and so on. Instead of the claim that 
correlational evidence always has to be supported by mechanistic evidence, a more guarded 
context-specific claim seems to be needed: this correlational data needs this specific back-
ground knowledge about mechanisms to infer a causal effect.
Aside from regress problems, HME also seems to contradict good causal reasoning, 
both common sense and formal. Common sense would seem to say that we can have good 
evidence that the flying ball broke the window or turning the ignition caused the car to 
start even if we do not know the intervening causes. In addition, our best current formal 
causal reasoning —that using causal graphs and deriving from them predicted dependen-
cies and conditional independencies in the data (Pearl, 2009)— makes no requirement on 
mechanisms beyond the vacuous claim that causal accounts need to specify the causes in-
volved. A causal graph like those depicted below in Figure 1 entails a specific set of inde-
pendencies; data consistent with those relations provide support. The result is evidence for 
causal claims, and there is nothing in this well-worked out logic that requires intervening 
variables.
So, general arguments for HME like the above seem not to work. Perhaps more spe-
cific considerations are compelling? As we saw, a major motivation for mechanisms by both 
philosophers and social scientists is to avoid confounding. Correlational evidence typical 
in many sciences can be a bad guide to causes because a correlation may just be the result 
of a common cause. Mechanisms are supposed to help solve this problem. We have already 
raised doubts about this assertion in that knowledge of mechanisms must likewise depend 
on correlational evidence, so the confounding is unlikely to be ruled out without further 
correlational evidence. But put that aside. Is it the case that considering mechanisms, cur-
rently in the sense of intervening or mediating causes, is essential to avoiding confounding 
in inferring causal claims?
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Following my contextualist approach, I think this question is unanswerable in this 
form. We need to get more specific. I would suggest that “confounding” is at least a 3-place 
relation. It is common to talk about confounders just as objects in the world or as variables. 
But “confounding” is an epistemological notion. So, the claims are really of this sort: “In-
ferences about causal hypothesis H relying on specific inference method or rule R lead to 
error in the presence of factors of type F.” As we will see, it can be shown (and has been) 
that this role of context can make a big difference in evaluating claims about mechanisms.
The standard approach in the social and behavioral sciences for looking for confound-
ers —“controlling”— is statistical conditioning. The simple case best known to philosophers 
of science is “screening off.” If the correlation between C and E in Figure 1 goes away when 
we condition on a potential confounder (CON) —when we look at C and E for values of 
CON— then the correlation between C and E may be spurious because CON is their com-
mon cause. This approach is embodied in the widespread practice of looking for confound-
ers by using multiple regression or related tools. Standard practice across the social and be-
havioral sciences is to regress C on E and add in other suspected confounders. Conditioning 
on CON, the thought is, will thus control for them. In this guise, HME would find wide, 
though not universal, acceptance in the social and behavioral sciences, for example.
Figure 1
A directed acyclic causal graph where arrows indicate causes and causal direction and CON stands 
for confounding cause, M stands for a mediating or intervening cause, COL stands for a collider, 
and OTH stands for other independent causes.
Thus, the potential situation is that we have a data set with identified correlations be-
tween a set V of variables. Our background knowledge tells us that variable C in V is a 
likely cause of variable E. We then, following standard practice, model this with the linear 
equation:
 E = bC (1)
To test (1) we add a constant a representing the intercept on the y-axis, e which is an error 
term representing either measurement error and/or unknown causes, and then a vector of 
control variables Z to produce the multiple regression equation:
 E = a + bC + Z + e (2)
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This sort of equation is the most dominant approach to quantitative analysis in the social 
sciences, with various statistical tests such as ordinary least squares being used to evaluate 
them. Multiple regression equations are everywhere in the social sciences.
To give a concrete example, there is a huge literature in economics on the determinants 
of economic growth. It works by taking national data from most countries in the world on 
a variety of variables along with measures of annual GDP. That data is then used for statis-
tical tests based on multiple regressions like that described here (see Kincaid, 2021).
The mechanistic thought is that we escape the worries about such approaches that cor-
relation is not causation because of confounding by specifying the real direct causal process 
relating E and C under controlled conditions. Unfortunately, HME in this form is not just 
wrong but actually sometimes epistemically pernicious. The bad effects here, recall, are for 
HME embodied in multiple regression methods, the work horse of much social scientific 
research. Over the past twenty years or so the potential problems have been raised and then 
repeatedly demonstrated (Pearl, 2009). The general practice of adding control variables to 
regressions beyond those thought to be the causes of interest results in identifiable errors in 
inference.
The errors are easy to see once pointed out, even if it took literally more than a century 
of statistical confusion to get there. For any given member of Z in (1), it might represent 
one of the following possibilities:
a) a common cause CON causing both C and E.
b) a mediating variable M between C and E.
c) a collider variable COL where both C and E cause COL.
d) another variable OTH that effects E and is neither a common cause, mediator, or 
collider.9
These are illustrated in the diagram in Figure 1. Figure 1 describes a “directed acyclic 
graph” because the arrows show the direction of causation and no causes circle back to 
themselves. This causal graph, without controlling any of the variables, entails dependencies 
or associations only between variables linked by arrows. The graph in Figure 1 only entails:
C ⊥ OTH
It is only when we control or fix variables in Figure 1 that new associations result or are 
eliminated; these are set by the logic of causal graphs.
Thus, in Figure 2 in the first case —(a)— CON is controlled for as represented by its 
shading. Now we know that:
C ⊥ E ,
if these are the only variables. It is this situation that fuels the mechanistic thought that 
controlling variables will reveal the real causal process and eliminate confounding. Indeed, 
it does so but only if (a) is the case and no other variables are at issue except CON.
9 Things are actually a bit more complicated for parents and ancestors of the three types of factors may 
be relevant; such detail is not needed for my point, however.
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Figure 2
Illustration of common cause (a), mediating cause (b), and a collider (c) where these have been 
controlled for (indicated by gray shading) and the corresponding implications about dependency 
between the variables.
However, when the members of Z are either mediators or colliders (panels b and c in 
Figure 2), including Z leads to systematic errors in causal inference. In the collider case (c), 
holding COL fixed creates a correlation between C and E even if there were no causal rela-
tion as there is in Figure 1. In the mediator case, (b) of Figure 2, holding M fixed eliminates 
the correlation between C and E even if there is a real causal relation. So now C ⊥ E / M.
Moreover, these problems potentially extend even further. Automatic adding of possi-
ble mechanisms really opens up indefinite possibilities for making biased inferences about 
causes. If Z includes the effect of a mediator, then conditioning on that effect fixes M 
even if it is not in Z. Then the C-E correlation goes to zero just as it we had conditioned 
on M. Similarly, if Z includes the cause of a collider —its parent in the language of causal 
graphs— a spurious, noncausal correlation is created between C and E even though the col-
lider itself is not controlled.10
10 Actually, the possibilities for errors do not stop here. If I condition on a collider whose causes are U1 
and U2 and U1 causes E and U2 causes C, I introduce a spurious correlation between C and E. This 
happens even if I know the M between C and E.
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We can give this destructive conclusion about mechanisms a constructive spin. While 
it is wrong that we always have to have the mechanism for causal inference, it is true that 
we need to know what is not the mechanism when regression is our empirical tool; we need 
to know that our variables are not causal mechanisms between C and E and that C and E 
do not have a common effect. Knowing that much causal structure is important.
A similar story —that shows we do not need the mechanism— can be given about the 
need for mechanisms which unobserved common causes suggest (panel a in Figure 2). Un-
observed causes can be potential confounders by creating spurious correlations by causing 
two otherwise independent variables. However, I can eliminate a possible confounded cor-
relation by ruling out common causes while not knowing if any of them are real. One way I 
can do so is by holding constant —here, regressing on— a suspected confounder and show-
ing that the correlation between C and E stands. Complete confounding of the C to E 
causal relation is thus ruled out for that possible situation, and I can then repeat the proce-
dure for other worrying variables.
There are still other methods for dealing with common causes in this indirect way. 
Results in formal causal modeling such as instrumental variables or the use ancestral 
graphs (Angrist and Pischke, 2008 for instruments and Pearl, 2009 for both) are ways 
to deal with certain types of possible common causes that are not observed; it can be 
shown that in certain circumstances the causal inferences are reliable even if there are 
common causes and we do not know what they are. I will not go into details here. How-
ever, the moral in all these cases is that HME is implausible as a general methodological 
norm.11
4. Claims About Vertical Mechanism
We earlier distinguished horizontal from vertical mechanisms. Vertical mechanisms are the 
realizing detail, the microlevel components of a given whole. Much of the general literature 
on mechanisms (Machamer et al., 2000) is as much about these part-whole or micro-macro 
connections. No doubt there is much of value in looking at these relations for a better un-
derstanding of scientific practice and in particular of explanation. The question here, how-
ever, is what role these lower-level details play in confirmation. Philosophers working in 
the mechanism tradition are less clear that vertical mechanisms are essential or primary in 
confirmation; their concern is largely about explanation and discovery. However, as I point 
out below, many social scientists have claimed that microfoundations are essential for any 
well confirmed theory. So, claims about necessary vertical mechanisms are important to 
consider.
The obvious parallel strong thesis about vertical mechanisms is:
VME: Vertical mechanisms taken as lower-level or realizing factors are essential to establish a 
causal relation between correlated purported factors C and E.
11 I have given arguments about mechanism in establishing that there is a causal effect. Looking at mech-
anisms as necessary for effect size raises similar issues that I do not have space to detail here. However, 
it is obvious, for example, that total causal effect size is biased up from controlling for a collider and is 
biased down in controlling for a mediator. 
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The intuitive story supporting VME comes from the undoubted progress in science by ex-
plaining traits at one level by seeing what brings them about at another level. The gas laws 
as macroscopic claims, for example, are explained by facts about the state of the molecules 
that compose them. The functioning of cells is explained via their molecular components. 
By explaining macroproperties, the realizing details tell us how macrolevel causes work. At 
least that is the thought.
Lurking in the shadows here are a variety of reductionism issues. I will skirt them as 
too fraught for the space here in hopes of noting some less complex considerations. VME 
is subject to some of the same difficulties that confronted HME. Both regress problems 
are applicable. Reminiscent of the “its turtles all the way down” joke, we can ask what level 
of underlying detail is needed and why. As we will get to shortly, it is plausible that under-
standing the realizing micro details of macro causes may increase our confidence in macro 
claims. However, VME asserts that such details are necessary. So, either we need an expla-
nation why some level is basic or why the regress is not a problem. We are confronted with 
the prospect of quantum mechanics being essential for macroeconomics. I am not claiming 
that there may not be ways of stopping or averting such regresses, simply pointing out that 
it is a problem that needs addressed.
The second regress mentioned above surfaces as well. “Mechanistic evidence” is not 
some separate source over and above observed correlations and real or possible interven-
tions. A nice example comes from debates over “microfoundations” in economics (King, 
2014). Economists have been skeptical of macroeconomic causal claims for reasons like 
those motivating strong mechanism theses among philosophers: the macro level causal con-
nections seem too tenuous on their own. Econometric models of aggregate data are subject 
to a seeming unending list of potential missteps.
However, one standard microfoundations for macroeconomics describes the behav-
ior of firms and households. But how do we know about them? We rely almost entirely on 
correlations in observational data, with the best inferences often coming when nature pro-
duces those correlations by “natural experiments” – by something mimicking an actual ex-
perimental intervention. Economists probably have in the back of their minds finding yet 
a deeper, more secure turtle. At one time, it was thought that fundamentals of individual 
choice were a priori introspective truths. That would stop the regress. However, we now 
know that no such foundation exists. There is no escaping reliance on correlation of ob-
served changes, no special “mechanistic evidence” at the lower level that somehow is more 
certain than observed changes and correlations.
VME also conflicts, like HME, with common sensical and formal causal knowledge. 
On the everyday side, we know that flying rocks break windows in full ignorance of molec-
ular details. On the formal side, we know that in our some of our best worked out causal se-
mantics and modeling, realizing detail can be just what we do not need.
I use again the results from graphical analyses of causal claims and evidence. Central 
to the semantics of causal graphs —to tracing their implications about independencies be-
tween variables— is the assumption that individual variables are separate or modular in 
that we can analyze the effect of setting them —possibly hypothetically— to a particular 
value. That means in effect that we remove all the causal arrows coming into the variable to 
be set. So, we transform the causal graph in
Figure 1 into that of Figure 3 – we wipe out the arrow from C to M and fix M at some 
realized value m. This is the central core of graphical causal modeling.
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Figure 3
The causal relations described in Figure 1 have been transformed by an intervention, real or 
hypothetical, that removes the causal relation from C to M. The causal arrow in the graph has been 
“wiped out” and M replaced by m, an instance or token realization of the variable M. The corresponds 
to Pearl’s do operator and is essential for the semantics of drawing inferences from graphs. Logically 
related variables cannot be so transformed.
However, including realizing variables may violate these semantic conditions because 
there is a logical or analytic connection between a variable quantifying over a whole and 
one quantifying over the parts that make it up. I cannot set the one to a particular value 
without setting the other. This means I cannot use the semantics of causal graphs to infer 
things about these variables that I need to determine causal effects. A different but related 
problem comes from the statistical regression models used. If two independent variables in 
a multiple regression are perfectly correlated, the value of the regression coefficients are un-
defined. Multiple regression finds the value of dependent variable when one independent 
variable is changed while all other variables stay the same. If two independent variables are 
logically related, that cannot happen. When properties of the whole and properties of the 
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parts realizing them are both independent variables we may be trying something not possi-
ble.12
These problems with VME arise in using two widespread testing procedures across the 
social and behavioral sciences. They do not show that vertical mechanisms always cause er-
rors, only that they can in some standard circumstances. Again, the need for mechanisms 
depends on local detail.
5. Moderate Claims about Mechanisms
We have seen that HME and HVE are quite implausible as general theses. I look in this 
last section at more modest epistemological claims about mechanisms.13 Generalizations 
are generally difficult: the force of evidence about mechanisms usually depends on specifics.
Following the five questions of Section 2 but talking now of hypotheses in the abstract 
rather than causal claims and of evidence rather than data sets of correlations, we might ask 
about hypothesis H and mechanism M:
1. How much evidence do I have for H, not considering knowledge of M?
2. What does H presuppose about M?
3. How much evidence do I have about M?
These questions are in a sense trivial, since all they ask for is combing evidence and consid-
ering logical or theoretical connections among claims. Details have to be fleshed out case 
by case with the parameters noted above in Section 2, e.g. it needs to be specified whether 
we are talking horizontal or vertical mechanisms, if the causal claim is one of effect or effect 
size, and so on.
The general morals about mechanisms from these questions seem clear:
Mechanisms can count for much: If H makes strong assumptions about M, if H is only weakly 
supported on other grounds, and if we have strong evidence that M cannot be as H assumes or 
strong evidence that M is as H presupposes, then evidence about mechanisms is epistemically im-
portant.
Mechanisms can count for little: If H makes weak assumptions about M, if H is well supported 
on other grounds, and if our knowledge of M is limited, then evidence about mechanisms is not 
epistemically important.
12 These problems were noted in the causal modeling literature some time ago. A parallel but independ-
ent discussion has occurred more recently among philosophers of science in debates over intervention-
ist notions of causes and the explication of constitutive relations between wholes and realizing mecha-
nisms (Kastner and Andersen, 2018). There are interesting open issues raised by this literature which I 
do not take up here.
13 Defenders of strong claims about mechanisms sometimes slip in qualifiers such as “usually.” I have no 
idea how to specify what the population of uses would be in order to calculate the frequency of need 
for mechanisms and no idea what criteria to use to decide which percentage use would constitute “usu-
ally,” so I am not going to try to sort out such hedges. On my view a “usually” qualification suggests 
that not much is being said and that we need to get more specific and spell out concretely where and 
why mechanisms do and do not matter. 
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These morals are, of course, disappointing if you are yearning for substantive methodolog-
ical norms or rules. To the question whether mechanisms are essential, these rules just say 
that “it all depends...”. This is no surprise on the contextualist view, however. That does 
not mean there are no interesting questions about mechanisms nor that there are never cir-
cumstances where they are essential. The call instead is for specifics and concrete detail if 
we want to make a plausible case.
We have already seen, in a negative sort of way, specific situations where knowledge 
about mechanisms can be important, depending on what the causal world is like. There are 
numerous further interesting circumstances where mechanism matter a lot. I want to finish 
by detailing some examples.
The graphical causal framework suggests further ways adding mechanist detail can in-
crease confidence in results. For example, mechanisms can help increase the strength of ev-
idence because they raise the number of independent causal processes that need to be ex-
plained by a hypothesis of confounding. Suppose I propose that C causes E and defend 
that assertion on the grounds of correlation between the two in a given data set. The usual 
worry is that there is some third variable CON that, as the name suggests, tricks us by being 
the common cause of C and E which in fact are not causally related. However, suppose fur-
ther that I identify a possible mediating variable M and show that C and M are correlated 
in the data as are M and E. Now the ante is upped for the friend of CON. CON must now 
be the common cause of all three variables. Another set of correlations has to be found. 
Proving CON is now a more stringent affair. This point illustrates the common insight 
that a more detailed theory faces a tougher test than a looser one and correspondingly gets 
more credit when it passes.
There are no doubt other situations where we can show that knowledge of mecha-
nisms in one of its many forms adds to evidential strength in some contexts, as the de-
fenders of mechanisms have emphasized and illustrated. Steele (2008) and Ji mé nez-
Buedo and Squitieri (2019) have discussed situations where macrovariables may be less 
well measured or more complicated to observe and thus where lower-level mechanism 
potentially add value. Social scientists, particularly political scientists (Trampusch and 
Palier, 2016; Bennett and Checkel, 2015), recently have been emphasizing “process trac-
ing” as a concrete embodiment of the mechanistic idea. Case study work motivates the 
thought that showing how one thing leads to the next is important; social scientists 
claim that it can be done without the large -N type of correlations discussed above. The 
closest political scientists get to a logic of process tracing invokes Bayes theorem (Ma-
honey, 2016). Not surprisingly, however, all the work goes into giving evidence for the 
priors and likelihoods. How that evidence is supposed to be spelled out is still a very 
open question.
6. Conclusion
The debate and literature on mechanisms has raised a number of important issues. My ar-
gument has been that discussing mechanisms in general and in the abstract can only get so 
far. Many different things are meant by mechanisms; their rationales are various. Here I 
have taken steps to sort out differences in claims and differences in how they are supported. 
No doubt more work can be done in this direction.
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I have tried to assess a subset of those possible claims about evidence. To do that I have 
looked at causal claims and recent advances in causal modeling in the social and behavioral 
sciences. Doing so allows some claims around mechanisms to be made more precise and de-
cidable. Horizontal mechanisms and vertical mechanisms as necessary conditions for con-
firmation are very implausible. Less demanding claims that give mechanisms an important 
role in some contexts can sometimes be clearly specified and can be plausible. Progress in 
thinking about the role of mechanisms in science may best come from turning to details of 
scientific practice such as these.
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